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Background: Organisations spend a considerable amount of time and effort on diagnosing and analysing
risks within their organisation. In the area of occupational and process safety, a myriad of employee sur-
vey instruments is available. Many studies show that operational processes play an important role in an
organisations overall safety. Yet, so far safety surveys mainly focus on safety measures or operational
safety processes. A flexible instrument was developed with which a wide variety of constructs, from dif-
ferent disciplines, can be measured in a consistent and practical way. The resulting survey distinguishes
itself from existing safety surveys by extending the scope with the operational processes which are also
referred to as the ‘Core Business’.
Study: This study reports on the development of a catalogue of constructs which were derived from sci-
entific literature and practice. Each of these constructs has been developed with a view towards measur-
ability in an employee survey. The reliability and validity for fifteen of these constructs was assessed. Five
separate projects have been conducted within a range of organisations operating as high risk industries.
Results: Construct validity and the dimensional structure of the instrument have been established
through exploratory factor analysis and confirmed through confirmatory factor analysis. Diverse aspects
derived from motivational and ergonomic approaches to safety proved to be distinguishable in this anal-
ysis.
Conclusion: The described instrument allows the mapping and quantification of various aspects of the
operational process that are, based on existing knowledge, related to the occurrence of incidents.
 2016 Published by Elsevier Ltd.1. Introduction
Over the past decades front-running organisations and indus-
tries have been successful in reducing the frequency of occupa-
tional accidents within their organisation. The combined oil and
gas producing organisations for example have managed to reduce
the frequency of personal harm year on year since 2004 (OGP,
2013). Although on a broader societal scale accidents and incidents
still cause considerable personal harm (Takala et al., 2014) or, in
the case of major high impact events, have consequences for busi-
ness, people and environment (Baker et al., 2007; Onderzoeksraad
voor Veiligheid, 2013; GPO, 2011; Powell, 2006a, 2006b, 2006c).
The ability to map factors that may contribute to accident causa-
tion is therefore of great importance. Safety surveys are a commontool for this purpose. Here we will first provide a short review of
existing safety surveys where we focus on two dominant
approaches related to ‘motivational aspects of safety’ (e.g. Zohar,
2010) and ‘workplace conditions and systems’ (e.g. Reason,
1990). First, we focus on safety climate research, thereafter we
describe surveys related to workplace conditions. Subsequently,
we will present a new approach which intends to span domains
and enable a more flexible approach to safety surveys. The overall
goal of this paper is to introduce a newly developed catalogue of
constructs. The resulting survey distinguishes itself from existing
safety surveys by extending the scope with the operational pro-
cesses which are also referred to as the ‘Core Business’. Since safety
is an integral part of successful business operations (Zwetsloot
et al., 2017), this instrument can be starting point for organisations
to enhance their operational safety through integral system man-
agement. The first findings concerning the reliability and validity
of these constructs are provided.structs.
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Understanding the complex array of factors that may contribute
to accident causation is no easy task. One way to gain proactive
insight is the study of organisational (safety) culture and safety cli-
mate (Guldenmund, 2007; Parker et al., 2006; Zohar, 2010). The
concepts of safety culture and safety climate are closely related
(see Guldenmund, 2007 for a discussion), generally organisational
safety culture is seen as a more generic, overarching concept
whereas safety climate refers to attitudinal and more overt mani-
festations of culture within an organisation. For recent literature
reviews concerning safety climate we refer to Griffin and
Curcuruto (2016) and Schwatka et al. (2016). In this area the use
of questionnaires has been the most popular approach as a ‘quick
and dirty’ method to gain insight into momentary safety attitudes,
more accurately referred to as the organisation’s safety climate
(Guldenmund, 2007). Measuring safety perceptions or safety cul-
ture is not only popular in academia but is also used extensively
within the wider industry, over 60% of organisations measured
safety perceptions or safety culture within their organisation in
one survey of Dutch safety professionals (van Kampen et al., 2014).
Extensive research has been conducted on the measurement of
safety climate through questionnaires (see for example: Christian
et al., 2009; Clarke, 2006; Guldenmund, 2000, 2007; Kines et al.,
2011; Zohar, 2010). As a result, a large number of different ques-
tionnaires has been designed to measure safety climate, with each
questionnaire using (slightly) different operationalisations of the
concept, although with a similar goal. In order to use safety climate
scores as a valid indicator for safety within organisations it is
important to know the extent to which these scores are predictive
of safety outcomes. Only a subset of safety climate studies takes
the step to correlate the concept with safety outcomes, these have
been summarised in several literature reviews and meta-analyses.
Clarke (2006) analysed 28 studies which contained measures of
safety climate combined with a measure of actual incidents or
injuries (occupational accidents). She found that the relationship
between safety climate and accident involvement was small and
moderated by research design. Nahrgang et al. (2007) also found
a small yet significant correlation between safety climate and acci-
dents or injuries based on their meta-analysis of 24 studies.
Christian et al. (2009) most recently conducted a systematic review
looking not only at relationships between safety climate constructs
and outcomes but more broadly at safety knowledge, motivation,
performance (compliance and participation), personality and
safety climate. Again, they found a modest relationship between
safety climate and safety outcomes and identified a broad variety
of concepts which were included in safety climate studies and
were correlated with some proxy-outcome measure of safety
(e.g. safety compliance and participation).
On the basis of these and other studies Zohar concluded in 2010
that recent meta-analytic studies revealed that safety climate
offers robust prediction of objective and subjective safety criteria
across industries and countries. Zohar, however, also concludes
that much work is needed in exploring the relationship between
safety climate and its antecedents and mediators. This is also
apparent from the meta-analysis from Christian et al. (2009). They
show the primary focus of current safety climate literature through
a meta-analytic path analysis (Fig. 1) which was by necessity lim-
ited to only the factors which were found most consistently in the
literature.
As can be seen from Fig. 1 the safety climate literature is cur-
rently focused on Safety compliance – the extent to which employ-
ees report adherence to obligatory safety behaviours – and Safety
participation – the extent to which employees self-report addi-
tional positive safety behaviours which are not ‘obligatory’. These
behaviours are the main hypothetical mediators used in some formPlease cite this article in press as: van Kampen, J., et al. Assessing the statistic
Safety Sci. (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ssci.2016.10.018within most of the studies and they are grouped by Christian et al.
(2009) as ‘safety performance’. These factors are observed to relate
negatively to (self-reported) accident and injury involvement and
seen to be positively shaped by ‘safety knowledge’ and ‘safety
motivation’ and in turn by ‘safety climate’. The model shows the
person-oriented (behavioural) focus of safety climate research in
current practice with main pathways through individual motiva-
tion, individual knowledge and rule following behaviour.1.2. Workplace conditions and systems orientation
Whilst intentional behaviour is evidently relevant for safety,
other studies suggest that behaviours which can be influenced by
knowledge and motivation are only a subset of those which are rel-
evant. Aspects of the situation in which the work is conducted are
seen to be at least, as if not more, relevant (Wagenaar and
Groeneweg, 1987). Winsemius for example in 1965 writes that:
It is too easily forgotten that a ‘human factor’ as a direct causal
element in the genesis of an accident can only mean some form of
human behaviour which is not only determined by the individual’s
personal traits, but also by the situation the individual has to cope
with (p. 151). It therefore seems to be especially useful to expand
on the role of human error probability and latent conditions in
relation to safety climate (Dekker, 2014, 2015). In his influential
book ‘Human Error’ Reason (1990) identified particular types of
cognitive error and combined it with earlier work on levels of cog-
nitive processing (Rasmussen, 1980). Groeneweg (2002) reported
on the development of basic risk factors or ‘general failure types’
and their assessment using a questionnaire instrument called
TRIPOD Delta. The importance of systemic and organisational
performance shaping conditions has been clearly established
(e.g., Groeneweg, 2002; Hollnagel, 1998; Reason, 1990, 1997).
The findings of the investigation into the explosion of Piper
Alpha (Cullen, 1990) lead to increased attention for organisational
factors and the development of safety management systems.
Organisational factors which are thought to influence worker con-
ditions have been classified in many ways. The concept of basic risk
factors (Groeneweg, 2002; Wagenaar et al., 1994) was developed
by starting from the latent failure ‘Swiss cheese’ model of accident
causation (Reason, 1990). At a similar point in time Hollnagel
(1998) identified nine ‘common performance conditions’.
Guldenmund et al. (2006) identified nine elements of so-called
management delivery systems which are primary safety manage-
ment processes. Zacharatos et al. (2005) looked at High-
Performance work systems and management practices in relation
to occupational safety outcomes. Ale et al. (2008) used seven deliv-
ery systems or ‘components of working safely’. Finally, Sklet et al.
(2010) identified seven risk influencing factors. An overview of the
themes these authors identified is included in Table 1.
As can be seen from Table 1 some similar concepts are included
in most of these approaches though with different labels and level
of detail. A questionnaire was central to the development of the
‘basic risk factors’. The TRIPOD Delta checklist which was devel-
oped in the nineties uses a questionnaire-based approach to mea-
sure performance on these aspects (Hudson et al., 1991, 1998;
Groeneweg, 2002). The instrument consists of a broad database
of binary questions on observable characteristics of latent failures
grouped into the factors. The instrument was used extensively in
practice and was shown to provide additional insight into the per-
formance of safety management systems over a purely audit based
approach (Cambon et al., 2006) and was adapted to a healthcare
setting (van Schoten et al., 2014). For the other taxonomies, quan-
tification of organisational contributions to ‘human error’ has
instead been focused on methods such as systematic interviews
(Vinnem et al., 2012) and expert judgement (Ale et al., 2008;al properties and underlying model structure of fifteen safety constructs.
Table 1
Risk factors and delivery systems.
Basic risk factors (Reason,
1990; Groeneweg, 2002;
Wagenaar et al., 1994)
Common performance
conditions (Hollnagel,
1998)
Delivery systems (Guldenmund et al.,
2006; Duijm and Goossens, 2006)
Risk influencing factors
(Sklet et al., 2010;
Vinnem et al., 2012)
Delivery
systems (Ale
et al., 2008)
Zacharatos et al.
(2005)
– Design – Adequacy of man-
machine interface and
operational support
– Design specification, purchase,
construction, installation, interface
design/layout and spares
– – Interface –
– Hardware – – Inspection, testing, performance
monitoring, maintenance and repair
– – Technology –
– Maintenance management
– Housekeeping – – – – –
– Error enforcing conditions – Working conditions – – Workload and physical
working environment
– –
– Time of day (circadian
rhythm)
– Work practice
– Available time
– Procedures – Availability of
procedures/plans
– Procedures, plans, rules and goals – Procedures and
documentation
– Procedures –
– Training – Adequacy of training
and expertise
– Competence, suitability – Competence – Competence – Employment
security
– Selective hiring
– Training
– Communication – – Coordination, communication – Communication –
Communication
– Information
sharing
– Incompatible goals – Number of
simultaneous goals
– Commitment, conflict resolution – – Motivation – Contingent
compensation
–
Transformational
leadership
– Organisation – Adequacy of
organisation
– Availability, manpower planning – Management – Availability – Teams and
decentralized
decision making– Crew collaboration
quality
– Management of change
– Defences – – Risk (scenario) identification,
barrier selection and specification
– – –
– – – Monitoring, feedback, learning and
change management
– – – Measurement
– – – – – – Reduced status
distinctions
– – – – – – Job quality
Note: The aspects in this table have been sorted in such a way that broadly similar concepts are aligned in the same rows. A more precise matching of concepts is beyond the
scope of this article.
Safety climate
(management safety 
priority)
Safety movaon
Safety knowledge
Safety performance
-Compliance
-Parcipaon
Accidents and injuries
Conscienousness
Fig. 1. Model of safety climate (adapted from Christian et al., 2009). The dark grey aspects have most support from Christian’s meta-analysis. Christian added
conscientiousness as well but the estimates were partly on generic rather than safety specific data (see Christian et al., 2009, p. 11).
J. van Kampen et al. / Safety Science xxx (2016) xxx–xxx 3Hollnagel, 1998). Finally, these factors have been identified as
causal factors in a variety of incident investigations. For example
in relation to the ‘Storybuilder database’ of accidents (Bellamy
et al., 2007) and in a comparison between TRIPOD Delta and
TRIPOD Beta (Groeneweg, 2002).
1.3. Challenges for further development
From our review of currently available safety questionnaires,
challenges for further development were identified. Few, if any,
questionnaires combine both motivational and behavioural aspects
with workplace conditions and systems. More importantly, many
studies show that operational processes play an important role in
a organisations overall safety (e.g., Groeneweg, 2002; Hollnagel,
1998; Reason, 1990, 1997; Sklet et al., 2010). Yet, so far safety
surveys mainly focus on safety measures or operational safetyPlease cite this article in press as: van Kampen, J., et al. Assessing the statistic
Safety Sci. (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ssci.2016.10.018processes. For example, rather than looking at communication in
general, safety surveys address communication of safety relevant
information only (Sklet et al., 2010). This, however, misses out on
a significant and recognized proportion of operational processes
that can contribute to incidents.
In this paper, an instrument is introduced which promotes
integral system management. The constructs included in the
instrument aims not only at exposing direct safety weaknesses,
but also shortcomings in the ‘core business’. This based on the
premise that if operational processes play a role in incidents,
managing these operational process effectively and efficiently
should result in fewer incidents. The goal of the instrument there-
fore is to measure and map the operational processes to give the
organisation the necessary insights in which tools are most effec-
tive and in which parts of the organisation they should be
employed.al properties and underlying model structure of fifteen safety constructs.
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Given these challenges we set out to develop an instrument
with which a wide variety of constructs, including safety and oper-
ational process themes from different disciplines, can be measured
in a consistent and practical way.
2.1. Goals of the instrument developed
The new instrument should make large scale application in
industry practical. This requires the design of a flexible instrument
which makes it possible for users to select the topics of interest
which are relevant for a particular project from a catalogue of sep-
arate constructs. Different combinations of constructs should still
be easy to answer without forcing a cognitive burden on respon-
dents through jarring changes. Constructs should therefore use a
consistent writing style and the same or similar answer categories
when possible. This last goal complicated an indiscriminate inclu-
sion of existing instruments.
2.2. Goals of the present validation study
Goal of the present validation study is to briefly describe the
constructs used in the instrument and to report on the tested
reliability and construct validity for the developed constructs. This
latter goal is achieved through reliability analysis, exploratory
factor analysis (EFA) and confirmatory factor analysis (CFA). The
long-term goal of the project is to expand data-gathering using this
instrument and to test criterion validity at the analysis level of an
organisation. This study means to validate the first fifteen
constructs both addressing motivational as well as workplace
condition aspects of safety. Analysis is based on the application
of the instrument amongst five organisations in the period
2013–2015.3. Instrument development
The instrument was developed through the following phases:
– Identifying relevant themes.
– Defining and operationalising constructs.
– Preliminary use in eight projects.
– First analysis of statistical properties followed by first revision.
To start with, relevant themes were identified with a team of
seven safety and human factors researchers. The constructs were
subsequently operationalised using three to ten concrete items
based on existing literature. Iterative scale and item generating
sessions were held by one researcher whereas another researcher
focused on identifying and refining items that could be used to
measure the constructs. Subsequently two versions were reviewed
by the other five researchers for conceptual clarity. This resulted in
an item pool of approximately 300 items covering 38 constructs.
These constructs include both direct safety measure (i.e., Priority
for safety), but also various operational processes (i.e., Procedures).
Table 2 provides an overview of the construct definitions and rele-
vant references of the 15 constructs included in the analysis for
this paper. In the remainder of this paper we will focus only on
these 15 constructs. Table 6 also shows all individual questions
included in the instrument for the 15 analysed constructs.
The first version of the questionnaire was tested across eight
projects within organisations. Data were separately analysed using
reliability analysis for each of these projects. A review was con-
ducted based on these projects in which the following important
considerations were made:Please cite this article in press as: van Kampen, J., et al. Assessing the statistic
Safety Sci. (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ssci.2016.10.018– Focus on the day-to-day (real-world) experiences of the
employees;
– Concrete and clear questions, with minimal abstract language.
The questions should be understandable for shop floor
employees;
– Elimination of so-called ‘double barreled’ questions;
– Relevant, with a clear explanation of how each aspect is related
to safety outcomes.
It was decided to change the response format from an agree-
disagree format towards an item-specific format to reduce agree-
ment/acquiescence bias (Saris et al., 2010; Podsakoff et al., 2003).
Response formats were changed to ‘frequency of occurrence’ or
on ‘extent of occurrence’. In addition, a do-not-know answer
option was added in an attempt to limit ‘averaging tendencies’
which may occur when respondents feel unable to answer a speci-
fic question. Questions were grouped thematically in order to facil-
itate responding through coherent groupings. This is known to
enhance scale reliability compared to random groupings, although
effects on scale validity are yet to established (Lam et al., 2002).
These changes required rephrasing a sizable part of the questions.
An example of one construct as used is shown in Table 3. All con-
structs make use of this five-point answering format. Most con-
structs use the same answer categories, while for some constructs
the answer categories vary due to the formulation of the questions
(e.g., Not at all; To a limited extent; To someextent; To a great extent
To a very great extent). The answering formatwas kept as similar as
possible for all questions to allow comparison between constructs.
4. Validation
Themeasurement toolwas further validated acrossmultiplepro-
jects with organisations within different sectors (e.g. energy net-
work organisations; drilling rigs; offshore installation; high tech
food industry; chemical industry). The projects were conducted in
the Dutch language in the Netherlands (four projects) and in the
German language in Germany (one project). The instrument was
used in one large project and replicated in four separate projects.
The participating organisations were organisations who had
approached TNO for gaining insight in the state of their safety. As
such, we made use of a convenience sample that was self-selected.
Nevertheless, the sample also represents the type of target organisa-
tion for which the current measurement tool is being developed.
As a result of differences in the exact assignment of each organ-
isation (i.e., what aspects of safety climate was relevant for their
particular case), there is variation in the constructs included for
each individual project. This is due to the flexible nature of the
instrument which allows some customization based on specific
and individual cases. This analysis focuses on the main overlapping
constructs. An overview of the projects and organisations is given
in Table 4.
All projects were part of safety assessments conducted within
the participating organisations. The projects were intended to gain
insight into and propose improvements to factors that shape safety
performance. All the organisations were engaged in relatively high
risk activities such as chemical processing and the management of
energy transport networks. Project 1 and 3 were business units of
the same parent organisation. Four of the projects were conducted
in organisations with operations partly subject to the European
SEVESO-directive. Projects were part of organisation initiatives in
which all, or a very large fraction, of the employeeswas approached.
4.1. Data analysis and preparation
Data analysis was conducted using IBM SPSS version 22 and R
version 3.0.2 with the CFA package Lavaan (Rosseel, 2012).al properties and underlying model structure of fifteen safety constructs.
Table 2
Overview of safety relevant constructs included.
Theoretical
constructs
Description Examples of earlier uses
Priority for safety The extent to which (senior) management is committed to and prioritizes safety Rundmo and Hale (2003), O’Dea and Flin (2003), Watson
et al. (2005), Hansez and Chmiel (2010), Lekka and Healey
(2012), Clarke (2013)
Leader consistency The extent to which leader priority and commitment is perceived as consistent –
Leading by
example
Management encourages safe working by setting a good example Fleming (2001), Wu et al. (2016)
Just culture Balancing learning from failure with appropriate accountability; i.e. not blaming
individuals for ‘honest errors’, but hold them accountable for wilful violations and
gross negligence
Hudson (2007), Reason (1997), Dekker (2007, 2008),
Dekker and Breakey (2016), Cromie and Bott (2016)
Staffing resources The quality of the support and resources provided by the organisation for the task or
work being performed
Hollnagel (1998), Zwetsloot et al. (2007), Reniers (2010)
Tasks roles and
responsibilities
Clarifying roles and responsibilities so that all levels of management and employees
are clear about which performance is expected
Hidden (1989), Hollnagel (1998), Health and Safety
Executive (2002, 2003), Baker et al. (2007), Lekka and
Healey (2012)
Procedures The existence of adequate procedures with proper usability to deal with (safety)
critical situations and operations to prevent violation and/or poor enforcement
Hollnagel (1998), Bell and Healey (2006), Deepwater
Horizon investigation report (2010), Lindhout et al.
(2010)
Management of
organisational
change
The extent to which changes (i.e. to working methods, organizational structure or
staffing resources) are carried out by taking into consideration any potential
consequences
Gupta (2002), Atherton and Gil (2008), Chief Counsel
(2011), Guidelines for Managing Process Safety Risks
During Organisational Change (2013)
Effective
communication
Efficiency of communication between various sites, departments or employees both
in terms of timeliness and adequacy
Hollnagel (1998), Groeneweg (2002), Newman et al.
(2016)
Craftsmanship The skillfulness and expertise of employees Mascini and Bacharias (2012), Mascini et al. (2007)
Work planning The quality of planning and coordination for various sites, departments or employees Varonen and Mattila (2000), Rodrigues et al. (2015)
Training The level and quality of training, together with operational experience Meshkati (1991), Bell and Healey (2006)
Personal
anticipation
The extent to which individual workers anticipate potentially risky conditions/events
that may occur at work
Waugh et al. (2008), Probst et al. (2013)
Technical state The extent to which the equipment and facilities of the organisation are of high
quality
Hollnagel (1998), Groeneweg (2002)
Safety
participation
Behaviours such as participating in voluntary safety activities or attending safety
meetings
Griffin and Neal (2000), Neal and Griffin (2004),
Curcuruto et al. (2015, 2016)
Table 4
Organisations and projects.
Year Organisation business
activity
Approximate
organisation size
Dataset size before
and after cleaning up
Response rate as
percentage of administered
Method and
language
Project 1 2014 Energy transport 2250–2500 N = 1553/1269 65% Digital, Dutch
Project 2 2014 Chemical processing 250–500 N = 187/166 73% Digital, Dutch
Project 3 2014 Energy transport 250–500 N = 258/235 84% Digital, German
Project 4 2015 Specialty chemicals 1000–1250 N = 833/706 73% Digital, Dutch
Project 5 2015 Equipment maintenance 150–200 N = 119/92 69% Digital, Dutch
Table 3
Example construct items and answering format.
In my department Never Sometimes Regularly Often Always Do not know
there are sufficient colleagues to carry out the work h h h h h h
it is possible to arrange a replacement if someone is ill h h h h h h
it is necessary to put in a lot of overtime h h h h h h
the right people are available h h h h h h
J. van Kampen et al. / Safety Science xxx (2016) xxx–xxx 5Respondents in all studies were free to interrupt and continue
the questionnaire at will and could also skip questions or choose
the ‘do not know’ response option. Missing data were expected
and individual cases were deleted when the respondents had
skipped a proportion of the questions when this was considered
to be too large (20–30%). After these deletions, the remaining inci-
dental blanks were substituted with the item mean.
The resulting dataset for Project 1 was randomly split in half.
Cases were assigned to one of two groups of approximately equal
size: Group 1 (n = 657) and Group 2 (n = 612). The datasets from
Project 1 were used for the exploratory factor analysis step. The
resulting datasets for the Projects 2 through 5 were used in confir-
matory factor analyses. The data from Project 5 (n = 92) and Project
3 (n = 235) were combined to achieve a sufficiently large dataset
(n = 327).Please cite this article in press as: van Kampen, J., et al. Assessing the statistic
Safety Sci. (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ssci.2016.10.0184.2. Reliability analysis
The Cronbach’s alpha reliability statistics for the included con-
structs were computed; coefficients alpha above 0.70 are rated as
(sufficiently) good and below 0.60 as inadequate (Joint American
Educational Research Association, 1999). As reliability analysis is
limited to correlation within a particular group of items more elab-
orate factor analyses were needed also.
4.3. Factor analysis
There is considerable discussion about the benefits of factor
analysis and choosing between exploratory (EFA) techniques and
confirmatory (CFA/SEM) techniques (e.g. Fabrigar et al., 1999;
Russell, 2002; Matsunaga, 2015; Schmitt, 2011). The items in oural properties and underlying model structure of fifteen safety constructs.
1 Values should be higher than 0.50 in order to continue with the factor analysis.
6 J. van Kampen et al. / Safety Science xxx (2016) xxx–xxxinstrument were grouped into hypothesized constructs based on
their content during instrument development. However, the items
were newly operationalized and had not yet been validated in this
exact form. Therefore, we decided to use both EFA and CFA. The
EFA we used to explore an underlying dimensional structure of
respondents’ answers. Replication with CFA was then used to con-
firm whether this structure was also apparent in data gathered
during subsequent measurements. For the EFA the dataset derived
from Project 1 was used with replications using CFA. In the CFA a
second-order model in which individual constructs were grouped
under overarching latent variables was tested additionally.
4.3.1. Exploratory factor analysis for Project 1
Extraction techniques used in EFA fit solutions to best describe
a specific dataset. As a result poor replication of the underlying
structure to a new dataset can occur and which has been noted
(Guldenmund, 2007). In addition to replication using CFA we partly
remedied this phenomenon by dividing our EFA data into two ran-
dom halves (Project 1, first half, n = 657; Project 1, second half,
n = 612).
The available literature additionally stresses the difficulty of
choosing the right number of factors to extract (e.g. Fabrigar
et al., 1999). An EFA can give different conceptual results depend-
ing on the number of factors extracted. There is a tendency to
‘over-extract’ factors when using common criteria such as the ‘Kai-
ser criterion’ (eigenvalues larger than one) and the so called ‘bend
in the scree plot’ criterion (e.g. Hayton et al., 2004; Fabrigar et al.,
1999). The recommended approach of a ‘parallel analysis’ was used
to determine the number of factors to extract. In this approach, fac-
tor eigenvalues are compared to eigenvalues of a similar extraction
from a completely random dataset (of the same size).
Finally, a decision had to be made on extraction and rotation
techniques. Overall principal axis factoring (PAF) with oblique
rotation is most appropriate for our instrument as intercorrelation
between constructs is expected (Russell, 2002). A factor analysis
with an oblique rotation can be used to identify factors even if they
are not orthogonal. In the analysis PAF extraction and the oblique
promax rotation were chosen.
EFA communalities were evaluated for both halves of the data
from Project 1. For most items both halves gave a similar score
for item communality. To decide on retaining items for the CFA
step two cut-off values for the individual items were used at 0.6
and 0.5. All items with a loading value below 0.5 in both halves
of the data were viewed as poorly contributing and were not
included in the CRA analysis. If an item loaded poorly in one half
of the data but more strongly (>0.6) in the other half of the data
it was included into the CFA.
4.3.2. Confirmatory factor analysis for all data
Confirmatory factor analysis was conducted on the available
datasets. Model fit was assessed using three fit indices: CFI, RMSEA
and SRMR. Threshold values defined by Hair et al. (2006) were
used which recognize that fit index thresholds are dependent on
sample size and number of items. The CFA analyses in this project
concern a relatively large number of items which requires a large
sample size; as a rule-of-thumb the amount of subjects should
exceed five times the amount of variables. To enable this, data from
Project 3 and Project 5 have been combined and analysed jointly.
With each replication the ‘simple factor structure’ as indicated
by the EFA analysis was tested first. For each replication this model
was compared to a single factor model. In addition, a second-order
factor model was tested along theoretically expected groupings.
Latent variables were allowed to correlate in all cases, which is
comparable to the choice for an oblique rotation in the EFA. Not
all constructs were available in each dataset. In these cases, only
the available constructs were used within the CFA model.Please cite this article in press as: van Kampen, J., et al. Assessing the statistic
Safety Sci. (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ssci.2016.10.0185. Results
5.1. Reliability analysis
Reliability coefficient alpha scores were computed for all the
included constructs and datasets based on the original grouping
of items. The coefficients ranged from 0.76 to 0.94, which is suffi-
cient for group level analysis and offers the first step in the
assessment.
5.2. Exploratory factor analysis
The first random half of the data consisted of n = 657 cases and
81 questionnaire items. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sam-
pling Adequacy (0.94) indicated a highly sufficient number of
cases.1 Bartlett’s test of sphericity was highly significant, v2(3240,
N = 657) = 33,275, p < 0.001, indicating that items were correlated
with other items. The second random half of the data which con-
sisted of n = 612 cases was similarly suitable for the application of
EFA.
The rotated component matrix was assessed in order to identify
which items to keep and which to drop. Items were assessed on
size of loading using the method described above using cut-off val-
ues of both 0.6 and 0.5. From the original 81 items, 13 items were
dropped due to cross-loading or the lack of a distinct factor load-
ing, leaving 68 items. In Table 6 the items that are dropped have
been marked. Factor communalities for both halves of the data
are shown below in conjunction with the CFA parameters in
Table 5.
Fifteen constructs were hypothesized. The exploratory analysis
suggested a twelve factor solution with three leadership aspects
merged into one construct. In addition, two aspects of planning
(work planning and personnel availability) emerged as a single
construct in one of the two EFA halves.
6. Confirmatory factor analysis
Confirmatory factor analysis was conducted subsequently on
the available datasets. Each dataset was analysed three times:
– Model A: a reference ‘single factor model’ in which all items
were assumed to be related to only a single ‘common factor’.
– Model B: a model as suggested by the EFA analysis using Horn’s
parallel criterion and using up to 12 constructs.
– Model C: a combined model in which ‘leadership’ and ‘planning’
were modelled as second order aspects.
If model A would exhibit the best fit to the data, this would be
indicative of a single underlying factor for all items such as: ‘a pos-
itive or negative assessment of safety’. Fit of model B would be
indicative of the 12 factors from the EFA providing the best fit.
Through model C it is hypothesized that the involved latent factors
are themselves again grouped at a second order level. In Table 5 fit
indices and tests are shown for the different models as applied to
the data for the projects which were included.
For all models (A, B and C) a significant v2 is expected, given the
size of the datasets, and this is also found. Model B provides a bet-
ter fit than the simple single factor model in all cases. The second-
order model (model C) outperforms the simpler ‘model B’ and
leads to a modest increase in fit indices. Final models show a CFI
value greater than 0.90 and a RMSEA value below 0.07.
Finally, the parameter estimates for each item in the question-
naire were assessed. When assessing the parameter estimates weal properties and underlying model structure of fifteen safety constructs.
Table 5
Fit indices for different factor models.
Project 1 Projects 3 & 5 Project 2 Project 4
N 1269 327 166 706
Model A: Single factor
CFI 0.40 0.49 0.59 0.48
v2 34,992 9288 1427 8868
DF 2210 1890 350 300
Model B: Up to twelve factors
CFI 0.87 0.86 0.93 0.95
v2 9245 3790 520 679
DF 2144 1824 335 265
Final model: Including second-order factors
CFI 0.92 0.90 0.95 a
v2 6400 3244 459 a
DF 2210 1819 333 a
p-value (v2) 0 0 0 0
RMSEA and 90% C.I. 0.040 0.049 0.048 0.047
(0.039–0.041) (0.046–0.052) (0.037–0.058) (0.043–0.051)
RMSEA p-value (probability RMSEA < 0.05) 1 0,74 0,63 0,863
SRMR 0.052 0.056 0.051 0.034
Difference tests
– Test of difference (A vs B) p < 0.001 p < 0.001 p < 0.001 p < 0.001
– Test of difference (B vs C) p < 0.001 p < 0.001 p < 0.001 –
a A second order factor model could not be tested with the data available from project 4.
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parameter estimate, i.e. the loading of an item onto a factor, greater
than 0.5 was needed although it should preferably be above 0.7. In
our final decision we weighed the items’ performance in the avail-
able data. The combined table reproduced shows all items and
their parameter estimates (Table 6). Based on the replications it
was decided to drop three additional items for a total of 16 items
dropped. One item was related to the construct ‘just culture’. As
a result, the construct is now only defined by two indicator items.
It will be revised/expanded in later versions of the instrument.7. Conclusion
This study reports on the development of a catalogue of con-
structs which were derived from scientific literature and practice
and which are thought to be relevant for safety within organisa-
tions. The catalogue includes relevant constructs which are related
to different scientific approaches – i.e. the safety climate approach
and the workplace conditions and systems approach. Each of the
constructs in the catalogue has been developed with a view
towards measurability in an employee survey. A common problem
in the development of safety surveys is that answering formats and
themes are widely divergent. The constructs were developed to be
similar in their wording and to use a consistent rating method. The
harmonisation of question types and integration into a single for-
mat has the additional benefit that differences in the factor load-
ings of items are less likely to be the result of the method or
form in which questions were posed.
Fifteen out of 38 constructs in the catalogue – which were con-
sidered to be the best developed and most widely used – were
evaluated. The analysis was conducted on data derived from four
projects within different organisations which are all active in high
risk industries. The projects included a total of 2468 respondents.
Internal consistency and discriminant validity was assessed using
a combination of Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) and Confirma-
tory Factor Analysis (CFA). Both approaches were combined and
multiple datasets were used to limit the risk of overfitting within
a particular dataset. EFA was conducted on two randomly split
halves of the data from the largest project (P1) and presented an
exploratory factor solution which substantially matched the design
expectation and was similar across both random halves. Confirma-Please cite this article in press as: van Kampen, J., et al. Assessing the statistic
Safety Sci. (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ssci.2016.10.018tory factor analysis presented acceptable fit measures across the
datasets from the different projects. Finally, a model in which three
elements of safety leadership and two aspects of planning were
organised using a second-order factor structure showed the opti-
mal fit to the data.
Components focused onworkplace conditions and systemswere
clearly distinguishable in the factor analyses from components
focused on personalmotivation. This shows that respondents –with
the use of this survey – are able to provide a multi-component
insight into elements of safety. The aggregated results can provide
diagnostic information which can help organisations to find effec-
tive and efficient ways to improve their safety performance.
In conclusion, this instrument allows the mapping and quantifi-
cation of various aspects of the operational process that are, based
on existing knowledge (e.g., Groeneweg, 2002; Hollnagel, 1998;
Reason, 1990, 1997; Sklet et al., 2010), related to the occurrence
of incidents. This allows organisations to identify weak points in
their operational process which if remedied contribute to a more
effective, more efficient and therefore safer ‘core business’.8. Discussion
This study forms the first step in the goal to investigate and val-
idate the developed constructs across datasets. Further expansion
will allow for evaluation of the factor structure of new constructs
where the same overall approach can be used. It will be critically
important to continue to evaluate the uniqueness of each new con-
struct with respect to existing measures. For example: consider-
able interest has been put towards the idea of a ‘zero accident
vision’. A new measure for the presence/absence of this type of
vision in an organisation could be compared to existing constructs.
Several limitations should be noted with regard to the current
study. Based upon current literature there is a presumed relation
between the factors included in the measurement and safety out-
comes. However, this relationship has not been tested in the pre-
sent study. Safety outcomes in this case should be evaluated at
the level of existing groups, for example, by correlating survey
scores with organisation or business unit performance. To conduct
an analysis with sufficient statistical power therefore requires a
substantial number of participating organisations to acquire suffi-
cient data.al properties and underlying model structure of fifteen safety constructs.
Table 6
All items and their parameter estimates.
Variable EFA
communalities
CFA parameter estimates Decision
Procedures, guidelines and regulations in our company P1(h1) P1(h2) P1 (h1&h2) P3 & P5 P2 P4
procedures_01 are clearly written and expressed 0.64 0.62 0.63 0.73 0.64 0.77 Retained
procedures_02 are conflicting <0.5 <0.5 Removed
procedures_03 are drafted by colleagues who are competent 0.54 <0.5 Removed
procedures_04 are easily accessible 0.78 0.72 0.69 0.71 0.62 0.67 Retained
procedures_05 are updated regularly and correctly 0.70 0.66 0.65 0.71 0.58 0.70 Retained
procedures_06 are known to the employees in the workplace 0.75 0.79 0.75 0.72 0.73 0.77 Retained
procedures_07 are easy to understand 0.85 0.74 0.73 0.72 0.78 0.78 Retained
procedures_08 really help in daily work 0.58 0.64 0.57 0.67 0.72 0.74 Retained
procedures_09 are changed without good reasons <0.5 <0.5 Removed
procedures_10 are changed without communicating <0.5 <0.5 Removed
Our company ensures P1(h1) P1(h2) P1 (h1&h2) P3 & P5 P2 P4
training_02 that employees can practice their skills ,73 ,85 0.70 0.70 0.80 Retained
training_03 that everyone is trained in major changes (such as new
equipment or procedures)
,82 ,88 0.83 0.79 0.78 Retained
training_05 that good training is available 0.88 0.87 0.84 0.76 0.85 Retained
training_06 that new employees will receive introductory training 0.58 0.58 0.57 0.72 0.67 Retained
In our company P1(h1) P1(h2) P1 (h1&h2) P3 & P5 P2 P4
tvb_01 It is clear who does what and when <0.5 <0.5 Removed
tvb_02 it is clear who has important knowledge and skills <0.5 0.64 0.66 0.58 0.77 Retained
tvb_03 colleagues with important knowledge and skills are available
when needed
<0.5 0.79 0.82 0.90 0.86 Retained
tvb_04 colleagues who are formally responsible are available
when needed
<0.5 0.75 0.84 0.85 0.85 Retained
tvb_05 colleagues have sufficient authority for the execution
of their tasks
<0.5 0.65 0.70 0.69 0.63 Retained
Changes in the way of working or organisation P1(h1) P1(h2) P1 (h1&h2) P3 & P5 P2 P4
orgChange_01 are well prepared 0.67 <0.5 0.78 0.86 Retained
orgChange_02 are well thought out and planned 0.69 <0.5 0.80 0.92 Retained
orgChange_03 are implemented with care for safety <0.5 <0.5 Removed
orgChange_04 follow one another too quickly <0.5 <0.5 Removed
orgChange_05 are well directed/controlled 0.72 <0.5 0.92 0.84 Retained
orgChange_06 are guided well 0.66 <0.5 0.93 Retained
In my department P1(h1) P1(h2) P1 (h1&h2) P3 & P5 P2 P4
persAvailable_01 there are sufficient colleagues to perform the work 0.75 0.68 0.72 0.66 0.67 Retained
persAvailable_02 it is possible to arrange a replacement if someone is ill 0.73 0.62 0.61 0.63 0.56 Retained
persAvailable_03 it is necessary to put in a lot of overtime 0.50 0.57 0.27 Removed
persAvailable_04 the right people are available 0.71 0.58 0.87 0.86 0.69 Retained
persAvailable_05 colleagues are available at the right time 0.68 0.64 0.85 0.86 Retained
If employees make a mistake or commit an error P1(h1) P1(h2) P1 (h1&h2) P3 & P5 P2 P4
just_01 they are comfortable reporting this <0.5 <0.5
just_02 they are treated justly 0.57 0.53 0.56 Removed
just_03 they get unfairly blamed by the manager(s) 0.87 0.76 0.81 0.76 0.72 Retained
just_04 unjust sanctions are imposed 0.81 0.80 0.76 0.57 0.76 Retained
just_05 colleagues resent them for their error or mistake 0.63 0.64 0.40 0.35 0.43 Removed
Just_06 they are comfortable asking others for help <0.5 <0.5 Removed
In our department P1(h1) P1(h2) P1 (h1&h2) P3 & P5 P2 P4
plan_01 good working arrangements are made <0.5 <0.5
plan_02 activities are planned thoroughly in advance 0.72 0.75 0.86 0.84 0.82 Retained
plan_03 the right resources are available for carrying out
the work
0.74 0.83 0.90 0.74 Retained
plan_04 activities are well coordinated 0.57 0.66 0.69 0.88 0.92 Retained
plan_05 the deployment of staff is planned well 0.57 0.76 0.82 0.85 Retained
My managers P1(h1) P1(h2) P1 (h1&h2) P3 & P5 P2 P4
priority_01 are committed to safe and healthy working 0.85 0.70 0.74 0.71 Retained
priority_02 give safety a high priority 0.86 0.72 0.73 0.78 Retained
priority_03 take safety seriously 0.88 0.73 0.74 0.74 Retained
priority_04 overlook violations when it is very busy <0.5 <0.5 Removed
priority_05 take safety into account when making investment
decisions
<0.5 0.51 Removed
consistency_01 are predictable in their behaviour <0.5 0.57 Removed
consistency_02 have a credible safety message 0.76 0.87 0.82 0.82 Retained
consistency_03 are consistent 0.67 0.83 0.79 0.78 Retained
consistency_04 Retained their promises 0.60 0.78 0.76 0.68 Retained
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Table 6 (continued)
Variable EFA
communalities
CFA parameter estimates Decision
Procedures, guidelines and regulations in our company P1(h1) P1(h2) P1 (h1&h2) P3 & P5 P2 P4
rolemodel_01 set a good example 0.79 0.87 0.83 0.88 Retained
rolemodel_02 inspire employees to behave in a safe manner 0.74 0.77 0.83 0.85 Retained
rolemodel_03 do themselves what they ask of others 0.80 0.84 0.84 0.87 Retained
The employees in my department P1(h1) P1(h2) P1 (h1&h2) P3 & P5 P2 P4
participate_01 voluntarily take on extra tasks to improve safety 0.73 0.70 0.64 0.67 0.59 Retained
participate_02 help each other to work safely 0.85 0.76 0.82 0.86 0.85 Retained
participate_03 discuss how the work can be done safely 0.90 0.89 0.85 0.87 0.87 Retained
participate_04 check whether a task can be done safely 0.93 0.89 0.88 0.82 Retained
participate_05 do everything to improve unsafe situations 0.77 0.83 0.82 0.86 0.78 Retained
participate_06 inform the manager(s) about unsafe situations 0.69 0.71 0.73 0.73 0.72 Retained
The employees in my department P1(h1) P1(h2) P1 (h1&h2) P3 & P5 P2 P4
open_01 know how to give and receive criticism amongst each other 0.64 0.71 0.69 0.72 0.88 0.74 Retained
open_02 know how to conduct difficult conversations 0.74 0.83 0.67 0.79 0.81 0.68 Retained
open_03 address each other about behaviour 0.75 0.82 0.71 0.76 0.78 0.75 Retained
open_04 communicate openly and honestly with each other 0.85 0.82 0.87 0.83 0.91 0.86 Retained
open_05 communicate easily with each other 0.79 0.77 0.82 0.77 0.91 0.81 Retained
open_06 communicate openly and honestly with their supervisor 0.70 0.74 0.81 0.74 Retained
The employees in my department P1(h1) P1(h2) P1 (h1&h2) P3 & P5 P2 P4
skilled_01 are professionally competent 0.87 0.83 0.85 0.83 Retained
skilled_02 know what is important when working 0.86 0.81 0.84 0.88 Retained
skilled_03 have experience doing the work 0.90 0.87 0.86 0.81 Retained
skilled_04 are knowledgeable about the work 0.92 0.90 0.88 0.89 Retained
skilled_05 do a good job 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.82 Retained
_ P1(h1) P1(h2) P1 (h1&h2) P3 & P5 P2 P4
anticipate_01 I anticipate potentially risky conditions/events which could
occur during my work
0.74 0.87 0.78 0.85 0.81 Retained
anticipate_02 Whilst working I keep a close eye out for threats or dangers 0.80 0.88 0.87 0.87 0.83 Retained
anticipate_03 During work, I am attentive to signals which indicate
a (possible) risk
0.81 0.88 0.87 0.89 0.79 Retained
anticipate_04 I have prepared for errors which may occur during work 0.83 0.74 0.65 0.72 0.62 Retained
anticipate_05 I investigate errors or deviations at work 0.75 0.74 0.61 0.67 0.55 Retained
The equipment and facilities in our company P1(h1) P1(h2) P1 (h1&h2) P3 & P5 P2 P4
techstate.pl_01 are of good quality 0.88 0.83 0.85 0.81 0.73 Retained
techstate.pl_02 are in a good technical condition 0.85 0.85 0.88 0.89 0.85 Retained
techstate.pl_03 are reliable and available 0.86 0.82 0.84 0.90 0.72 Retained
techstate.pl_04 are expertly maintained 0.71 0.76 0.65 0.82 Retained
techstate.pl_05 are maintained according to schedule 0.57 0.64 0.51 0.74 Retained
techstate.pl_06 are easy to operate 0.54 0.54 0.49 0.50 Removed
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language and reviewed extensively by representatives from partic-
ipating organisations. There was no indication that questions were
too difficult for the respondent in these organisations; however the
method still requires that participants have sufficient language and
intellectual abilities. The questions have not been tested and may
not be suitable for employees with underdeveloped language
abilities.
The study has been conducted in a relatively homogenous
group of organisations in terms of activity and safety performance.
This limits generalisability. All participating organisations put sub-
stantial effort into safety and had an active safety program. The
approach should be expanded towards other types of organisations
and safety domains, e.g., construction companies, hospitals.
In future research the safety survey results should be correlated
to concurrent measures such as the outcomes of an audit of the
safety management system or other safety and operational
outcomes.
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